

Washington, D.C. 20505

OLL 83-2403

4 OCT 1983

Honorable Dave Durenberger  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Durenberger:

I received your letter yesterday with its kind words about our efforts on the Intelligence Information Act. We have worked diligently through the spring and summer to reach agreement with you and your colleagues on this bill. We have done this because we are convinced, as you are, that the bill will relieve us of a needless burden without harming the interests of the press, authors, or the public at large. I am gratified to hear you say that as a result of our efforts you will be able to support this bill. I certainly believe it merits everyone's support.

Your views regarding the need for an accurate historical record are ones that I share. If Congress is willing to provide the resources, I am prepared to institute a new program of selective declassification review of those materials that we believe would be of greatest historical interest and most likely to result in declassification of useful information.

The term "selective" is very important. There is no point in reviewing files that we basically know will contain little releasable information. And it makes no sense to review -- or even to release -- material that has become releasable only because it is trivial. Our professionals have a pretty good sense of what is likely to prove releasable; and we would be happy to work with our Historian, other agency historical offices, the Archivist of the United States, and others to determine what topics are of the greatest interest and importance. Historians would have to trust us, however, to make these professional judgments in good faith. A declassification review program could function only if we maintained control over the workload and concentrated our limited resources on the areas where they would do the most good.

DCI  
EXEC  
REG

One certain consequence of this selectivity would be a concentration of our efforts on the review of older, as opposed to more recent, material. Such material which documents the early years of CIA could well result in the release of information that explains the role of intelligence in the making of foreign policy. As a general rule, we are likely to limit the declassification review program to files at least 20 or 30 years old. However, these older files would certainly contain information which continues to be relevant to today's world. I am hopeful that whatever material we can release, consistent with the need to protect sources and foreign relations, will make a major contribution to historical research and interpretation.

At the moment, I do not know whether our small historical staff would be in a position to manage a selective declassification review program. But no matter where such a program would be placed organizationally within the Agency, I understand that what you are suggesting is a program provided with adequate resources. Several weeks ago, on my own initiative, I had requested the Historian of the CIA to explore a program that would result in the release of usable historical materials from the World War II period. I look forward to working with additional resources having, as you suggest, the mission of declassifying and releasing historical materials that no longer require protection.

Please allow me again to express my appreciation for your support of S. 1324. With the enactment of this important legislation and the achievement of the necessary budget support, I believe this Agency would be more than willing to undertake a new selective declassification review program. With your leadership and support, we can forge a workable means of informing the public while still protecting our nation's secrets.

Sincerely,

**707 William J. Casey**  
 William J. Casey  
 Director of Central Intelligence

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EM:KAD:csb (3 October 1983)

Retyped: EM.KAD:maw (4 October 1983)

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING  
BETWEEN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
AND THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE


SUBJECT: Accessioning Records of CIA Predecessor Wartime Organizations into the National Archives of the United States - Associated Responsibilities and Procedures

1. In considering the transfer of Records of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Predecessor wartime organizations, primarily those of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), to the National Archives and Records Service (NARS) for accessioning and release to the public, the CIA has expressed concerns that the records may contain information that is inappropriate for immediate access. For purposes of simplicity, these records will hereafter be referred to as the "OSS records." NARS has provided assurances that its processing procedures will address and resolve these concerns before access is provided. This Memorandum of Understanding reflects mutual agreement that the CIA and NARS review procedures, outlined below will serve to expedite the release of OSS records to the public while providing appropriate safeguards against premature access.
2. The OSS records will be examined for declassification by the CIA. Documents or portions of documents under the final declassification jurisdiction of the CIA (successor Agency) which are found still to contain national security information despite the passage of time will be withdrawn from the records and withheld in the custody of the CIA. A withdrawal card bearing a unique number will be substituted for the withdrawn material. Upon completion of the CIA's examination, the records appropriate for transfer as permanent records will be sent to NARS for accessioning. The records will consist of declassified and unclassified material, except as indicated below.
3. Classified material which the CIA has determined does not require continued protection insofar as that agency's interests are concerned, but which may require continued national security protection in the interest of some other U.S. agency or of a foreign government will be transferred along with the declassified and unclassified OSS records. Such classified material will be identified by the CIA examiners by placing a tab around the relevant material or by affixing a tag to the individual items. It will be the responsibility of National Archives declassification specialists to review such identified classified material for possible declassification at appropriate intervals in accordance with applicable Executive Orders and Information Security Oversight Office directives. The CIA's Information and Privacy Coordinator will assist NARS officials responding to access requests when the identification of the responsible U.S. agency is unclear or when transmittal to the appropriate foreign government is required for declassification determination.
4. NARS will screen and withhold from access and/or refrain from copying for the public declassified or unclassified accessioned OSS records containing information about a living individual which reveal details of a highly personal nature that the individual could reasonably assert a claim to withhold from the public to avoid a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy, including but not


limited to information about the physical or mental health or the medical or psychiatric care or treatment of the individual, and that contain personal information not known to have been previously made public, and relate to events less than 75 years old (41 CFR 105.61.5302-4).

5. It is agreed that the OSS records still contain sensitive documents which could cause adverse international repercussions. Therefore, as records are transferred, NARS will conduct initial screening on a series or subseries basis. When files or documents are requested, a re-screening will be performed on potentially sensitive records before such items are furnished to researchers. At such time, NARS reviewers will exercise discretion regarding the release of records that might cause national or international repercussions. In case of doubt, or where CIA has identified sensitive records, NARS will consult with appropriate information specialists of the CIA concerning the propriety and/or legal basis for continued denial or release.

6. The procedures set forth in this Memorandum of Understanding will become effective upon execution of this Memorandum of Understanding by both NARS and CIA.

  
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ROBERT M. WARNER  
Archivist of the United States

May 25, 1984  
Date

  
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HARRY A. FITZWATER  
Deputy Director for Administration  
Central Intelligence Agency

5-June 1984  
Date

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